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Abstract 
Various p ieces of fede ral legislation attemp t to regulate ha zards 
ass ociated with chemicals , foo,d additives, drugs ,  consumer p rodu cts, 
pesticides, airborne and waterborne polluta nts . This legislation spans 
many decades and varies in the k inds of regulatory mechanisms created 
and in the degree of discretionary authority granted to regula tory 
officials . The s tated goals of th is legislation are to identify and 
p revent s ignif ica nt health a nd env ironmental hazards before they be come 
widely d ispersed throughout our s ociety and economy. Desp ite their 
seemingly broad and s traig htf orward congress ional mandates, howeve r, 
implementation of these p rograms has been slow. 
In this paper we will present a model of governmental regulatory 
choice. The model is based upon the behav ior of institutional actors 
in the decis ion p rocess�legislators ,  bureaucrats, and inte rest groups .  
The model will relate the institutional motivations of these a ctors and 
the influence of environmental factors, such as decision unce rtainty 
a nd group conflict of interest, to the choice of regulation. It will 
be deduced that increased uncerta inty over the impact of p rop osed 
regulations will induce the legislature not only to delegate the choice 
of regula tion to an adminis tra tive agency but also to p rov ide the 
agency with increased subs tantive discretionary authority and increased 
procedural decis ion making requ ireme nts. Confl icting inte rest group 
p references, for a g iven level of u ncertainty, will re inf orce these 
tende ncies. The model and these results will be employed to devel op a 
systematic explanation for the performance of env ironme ntal , health and 
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safety regulation. A few illustrations a re p rese nted to e xpl ore the 
valid ity of this e xplanation. 
A TH EORY OF THE CHOICE OF REGULATORY F ORM * 
Introduc tion 
This paper presents a theory of the form of regulatory 
intervention. The theory relates two key factors � dec is ion 
unc ertainty and group conflict of interes t � to the institutional 
motivations of legisla tors , b ur eaucrats and interest groups and thenc e 
to the choice of regulatory form. In that the model predicts 
(conditioned on.these two factors) the form of the r egulatory 
intervention to b e  chosen by C ongr es s ,  the model has further 
impl ications for the per forma nc e of regulatory agenc ies created to 
administer differing r egulations. 
The paper departs from prev ious work on the theory of regulation 
in three ways. First, existing theories of regulation have foc used 
lar gely on ques tions of or igin: Row does regulation arise and who was 
b ehind it (Abrams and Settl e, 1978; Jordan, 1972; MacAvoy, 1965;  Moore, 
1961; Plott, 1965; Posner ,  1971-1974; Rainey, Backoff, Levine, 1976; 
and Stigler ,  1971) 2 In contrast, we focus on th e form of regulation. 
The l egisla tiv e choice of r egulation can be seen as a multidimens ional 
choice in which the legisla ture chooses not only the policy ob jectives 
of the r egulation, but also the form of the r egulatory intervention; 
i. e. the policy mandate, the s ubstantive discretionary a uthority of the 
administering a gency, the regulatory instruments employed to implement 
the regulation, and the procedures whereby the administrative dec isions 
will b e  made. 
* 
The a uth ors would l ike to thank Br uce Cain, Morris F ior ina , Roder ick 
Kiewiet, Rob ert Bates and Gary Cox for th eir helpful c omments. Special 
thanks are acknowledged to Joh n F erejoh n and Roger Noll. This res earch 
was s up ported by the National Sc ienc e F oundation and the Mellon 
F oundation. 
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Sec ond, existing theor ies have tended to b e  either b ureaucratic or 
legislative in foc us ,  c enter ing up on the b ehavior of regulatory 
agenc ies and their r elationship with r egulated groups (DeAlessi, 1974; 
Eckert, 19 73; Hilton, 1972; Noll, 197la,b , c ;  and Russell and Shelton, 
1974) or upon the electoral proc ess and the influence and inc entives of 
the l egisla tive institutions (Fior ina , 1981,  1982; Mc Kie, 1970; 
Niskanen, 1975; P el tzma n, 1976; Shepsle and Weingas t, 1980; Weingas t, 
1978a,b).  Cr itical r ev iews of the l iterature on regulatory choice can 
b e  found in Joskow and Noll (1978) and Mccubbins (1982a ) .  In c ontrast, 
our model foc us es on interactions among the three institutional actors: 
the l egislature, the a dministrative a gency, and interest gr oups. 
Third, existing models have tended to b e  descr ip tive, wh ile ours 
is predictive in natur e. The possib il ity of prediction aris es b ecause 
we identify two determining factors (degree of uncerta inty and l evel of 
c onfl ict) . In partic ular our model can be used to predict the 
s tructural and operative features of an a dministrativ e  agency, in terms 
of these two factors .  
We argue that increased uncerta inty and c onflict of interest will 
induce the legisla ture not only to delegate the choic e  of regulation to 
an administrative a gency but also to prov ide the a gency with increased 
s ubstantive discretionary a uthor ity and increased procedural dec is ion 
making requir ements . Endowed with broad s ubstantive authority and 
faced with r igorous procedural requir ements , the regulatory a gency will 
r espond by expending large amounts of effort in promulgating a 
relatively small number of well defended r egulations. 
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The Model 
Our model is one of interaction among three institutional a ctors: 
the legislature, re gulatory agencies, and interes t groups. Clearly, 
these are not monol iths . They are not ind iv id uals maximizing a s ingle 
ob je ctive function by 11rational choice .11 Ea ch is made up of large 
numbe rs of ind iv id uals , and there a re many compl ica ted inte ractions 
within each of them. However, for this paper we a re most concerned 
with inte ractions between ins titutions , and we attemp t to emphasize 
less the interactions within each of the institutions. (For d is cussion 
of s ome of the inte ractions within, a nd how the inte ractions within 
relate to the interactions between, see McCubb ins 1982a,b . )  
Mccubb ins (1982b ) presents a s imple model of re gulation in which 
the choice of regulatory pol icy and the form of regulatory intervention 
a re the result of inte ractions between these three institutional 
actors. 
. 
1 We extend that model he re. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Figure l s hows the p rincipal means of action for the three actors .  
In the model the principal motivation for Congressmen is to seek 
continued electoral s upport. A principal means of gaining s upport, and 
thence votes , is through enacting legisla tion to amel iorate p roblems 
within their d is tricts. Interest groups,  who have p refe rences over 
re gulatory outcomes, are assumed to seek their ow n net benefit from 
regulation by s upplying campaign contributions to legislators , by 
lobbying, by s upplying e xpert informa tion, d irect p ubl icity, or by 
court a ction. Adminis trative agencies, resp ond ing to the incentives 
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created by the institutional structure of governme nt and as s upplied by 
the legislature ,  act as age nts for the legislature. As in other 
p rincipal-a gent relationship s ,  howeve r, the a gency may not necessarily 
act wholly in the inte rests of the legislature. The means of a ction 
for an a gency include command a nd control re gulation, provision of 
information or othe r p ublic goods , and establishment of dece ntral ized 
incentives such as e ffluent ta xes or l iabil ity rules. The agency, 
na turally enough, follows its ow n inte rests (to d is cover and fulfill 
its congress ional mandate; to preserve or increase its level of fund ing 
of a uthoriza tion) and the ob jective of the legisla ture in this relation 
is to use its p owers (as largely related to approp riations , 
a uthorization, and ove rsight) to creat'e incentives for the age ncy s o  as 
to align the a ge ncy;s inte res ts with its ow n. 
!h£. � tl Regulation 
There are several aspects which characterize the form of a 
re gulatory interve ntion; the pol icy mandate of the act, the s ubstantive 
authority, the regulatory instrume nts, and the adminis trative 
procedures. In choosing the form of re gulation, Congress makes choices 
which define these aspects. 
(l) Policy mandate. The p ol icy mandate is found in the p reamble 
or the find ings at the beginning of the act. In the Toxic S ubstances 
Control Act (TSCA) the pol icy mandate is to p rotect health and 
environme nt from toxic chemicals but not 11 unduly11 to inte rfere with 
innovation. Typ ically, the p ol icy mandate is s tated in noble language, 
des igned to appeal to as many groups as possible. Whateve r diffe rences 
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there may be in the form of regulatio n, they do no t appear to show up 
in the po licy mandate . In vagueness a nd desirability ( 11platitudinous 
wish lists11 F iorina ,  1 982) preamb les appear remarkably the same across 
o therwise differing forms of regulatio n.
(2) Substantive a uthority. In the body of an Act, specific 
respo nsibilities and powers are spelled out. Often sub .stantive 
a uthority is spe cified in stateme nts begi nni ng "The Administrator 
shall . . •  " . In TSCA, for e xample , the administrator has specific 
authority and d uty to provide information on the toxicity and e xpo sure 
of chemicals in commerce (Se ction 8); to require te sting of chemicals 
that "may present an unreaso nable risk (Se ctions 4 and 5) ; to e stablish 
a premanufacturing no tification program for new chemicals (Section 5) ; 
and to regulate chemicals which present a n  unreasonable risk or an 
imminent hazard (Se ctions 6 and 7) . 
( 3) Instr ume nts. A regulatory act also spells o ut the legal tools 
or instrume nts that the administrator can use to imp lement the act. 
Generally stated the instrume nts are of the following types: command 
a nd co ntro l, provision of information, direct provision of some p ub lic 
good, and decentralized economic ince ntive s.2 For e xample , in TSCA the 
administrator, by requiring manufacturers of chemicals to file reports, 
can provide i nfo rmatio n o n  e xpo sure and toxicity. The admini strator 
can also promulgate r ule s to require chemical manufacturers to test 
chemicals. Specific regulatory instrume nts are spelled o ut, as well, 
in Se ction 6 of the Act, most of which are of the command and co ntro l 
variety. 
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(4) Pro cedures. To use a parti cular regulatory instr ume nt, the 
agency must satisfy certain legal requireme nts, which are also spe lled 
out i n  the Act ( sometime s in refere nce to the Administrative Pro cedures 
Act). The Act spe cifies the process of hearings, the standards and 
b urdens of evidence in decisio nmaking, the points of a cce ss for o utside 
parties, the opportunities of judicial review, a nd the sta ndards of 
review. 3 
Conflicting Interests 
In the model, the nature of co nf lict among interest gro up s  a nd 
decision uncertainty are the principal determina nts of form of 
regulatory interve ntio n. For e xample, TSCA was e na cted o nly af ter five 
years of legislative str uggle. There were different goals among the 
interest groups. Enviro nmental groups and the p ublic at large wanted 
protection against the latent hazards of to xic chemicals; chemical 
manufacturers wanted to protect innovatio n and the benefits of chemical 
products. A great degree of group co nflict of interest ensures a 
lengthy and i nharmonio us legislative co nsideratio n. Whe n there is a 
long legisla tive battle, fine print accumulates at the various high 
water marks a nd turning points much as materiel and o ther debris mark 
the advances and retreats of a protracted military campaign. The 
longer the legislative battle the more procedures, safeguards, and 
co nditions that get built into the act.4 At the same time , to broaden
support for the bill, and to decrease the e xpre ssed hostility of 
particularly wounded interest groups, the policy mandate becomes 
broader and more diffuse.  
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With a h igh level of co nflict amo ng affe cted interest groups , the 
proposed legisla tio n becomes a hot potato .  If the leg islature makes 
s ubstantive decis io ns in the leg islation, it will almost certainly 
offend some already aro used interest group .  In this s ituation in the 
model s ubstantive decis io ns are delegated to the agency, by means of 
greater d is cre tio nary a uthor ity o n  substantive matters. For e xamp le, 
in TSCA the key term 1'unreaso nable r isk11 is used some forty times ,  but 
its def inition is left to the administrator . Whe n the agency then a cts 
under its s ubs tantive authority, the Congressman can br ing the 
administrator to the Hill before a n  oversight committee to e xplain why 
the agency imposed s uch heavy cos ts o n  ind ustry. Alternatively, when 
the agency does no t act, the administrator can be cr iticized for no t 
acting in sp ite of the s trong and broad s ubs tantive a uthor ity in the 
act. 
However , no t o nly is the amo unt of co nflict important, so is its 
compos ition. A commo n pattern of co nf lict helps e xplain the procedural 
comple xity and lack of d is cre tio n in s trongly co ntested acts, s uch as 
TSCA or the Federal Food, Drug a nd Cosmetic Act of 1 938 (cf . Mccubb ins , 
1 982a ) .  Some interest groups, like chemica l  manufacturers, are 
co nce ntrated , relatively wealthy, a nd ca n more easily bear the cos ts of 
organizatio n, lobby ing , and campaign co ntributio ns . Initially the 
ind ustry used its resources to oppose TSCA altogether . However , it 
also sought procedural 11safeguards" against "over-regulation". The 
safeguards would incidentally increase the cos t  of regulation to the 
agency and s ubsequently decrease the number of regulatio ns. In 
co ntrast, env iro nme ntal groups,  having smaller f inancia l  resources, 
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relied more o n  access to the media and the co urts as they attemp ted to 
affect the leg is la tio n a nd its implementatio n. It was also in the 
interes t  of env ironme nta l groups to load a b ill with procedures which 
would be come "action forcing" po ints of j ud icial access . For d ifferent 
reasons both the ind ustry and the env ironme nta lists wanted f ine print. 
Indeed, they wanted d ifferent f ine print, and each a ttempted to 
e liminate or tone down the o ther's f ine print, but often the compromise 
was to add f ine print to f ine print a nd co nd itio n o n  co nd itio n. 
In sum,  then, under circums tances of h igh co nf lict of interest the 
Congressman will prefer to pass the hot po tato to the administering 
agency by delegating to the agency a great deal of s ubs ta ntive 
d is cretion over the policies to be p urs ued a nd the reg ulatory 
instruments to be em.p loyed. On the o ther hand, co nf licting interes t  
group preferences will lead to a greater level o f  adminis trative 
requirements for decisio n.making (i.e . ,  less procedural discretion). 
Uncertainty 
The amount of uncertainty is a seco nd de terminant of the form of 
regulation. The uncerta inty may have to do with the nature of the 
prob lem regulation is s upposed to redress (it is not known which 
chemicals are to xic or how to xic) . Alternatively, the uncertainty may 
have to do with the potential cos ts of co ntrolling the hazard (at the 
time of regulation it was not know n if the cos t  of reducing vinyl 
chlor ide emissions would be in the b illio ns ,  as ind ustry claimed, or 
much les s ,  as it eventually turned out). Or , the congressman may be 
uncertain as to the true prefere nces or powers of the interest groups. 
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Whe n there is uncerta inty the patter n e stablished for co nf lict of 
interest is re inforced . Greater uncerta inty implies a greater 
like lihood of u nintended but harmful effects to o ccur , some co st of 
co ntro l to be miscalculated, or some harmful chemical to be overlooked . 
With greater uncerta inty come s greater political r isk and a greater 
ince ntive to pass o n  the hot po tato to someone else .  But even with 
greater uncertainty there is no need to relinquish co ntrol to tally. 
More comp licated procedural requireme nts can be written in to cover 
unexpe cted co ntingencies. A hot potato may be pa ssed o n  but there is 
no need to se nd over a loo se canno n. 
Moreover , with greater uncerta inty a Congressma n will no t know 
beforehand what his interests will ultimately be . He would like the 
interest groups to reveal their preferences and powers before be ing 
p inned dow n to particular substantive so lutio ns of particular problems. 
He would like to delegate spe cific problem so lving responsibility to 
the agency a nd sit back in a n  oversight role ,  awa iting clarification of 
the issue (cf . McCubb ins a nd S chwartz, 1 982) . De legating broad 
sub sta ntive d iscre tio n with narrow procedural d iscretion provides a 
so lutio n to the leg islator;s problem of decisionmak ing u nder 
uncertainty. 
The pattern of u ncerta inty , therefore, def ines the leg islator;s 
sub je ctive probabilities over the net benefits (and, therefore , his 
ele ctoral reward) to be associated with his po ssible cour ses of action. 
Whe n there is a great deal of conf lict between interest groups and the 
legislator 's sub jective uncertainty is great, the leg islator is like ly 
to act in ways that appear risk averse , even if he is an e xpected value 
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maximizer. He may reject actions with potentially high co sts, be may 
seek " security" points, he may delegate. 
In general, then, the greater the decisio mnaking u ncerta inty the 
greater the sub sta ntive d iscretion and the se t of regulatory 
instr ume nts de legated to the administer ing agency. Further, the 
greater the decisionmak ing uncerta inty the smaller the procedural 
d iscretion granted the administer ing agency. 
Implication for Regulatory Performance 
The form of the regulatory interve ntio n has im.portant implications 
for the performance of regulatio n. First if a n  agency has stringent 
pro cedural requireme nts which allow little d iscretio n, regulatory 
actions are likely to be few a nd far between. If an agency bas broad 
d iscretion in its sub stantive authority as in additio n  to narrow 
pro cedural d iscretion, there may be more attemp ted a ctio ns (again with 
few results) and ,  therewith, more fr ustratio ns inside the agency as 
well. 
There are several ways to evaluate the performance of a regulatory 
agency.5 It can be evaluated in terms of the e co nomic eff iciency of its 
regulations, or its additio n to social welfare . Alternatively, the 
agency can be evaluated from its own perspe ctive � d id it accomp lish 
its goals, d id it generate a large number of significant regulations? 
Performance can be measured from the point of view of the leg islature 
as well. Though we shall d iscuss a few of these views the model is 
pred ictive in nature a nd does not depend o n  any particular def inition 
of performance . 
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Economists have argued f or over a decade that regulation has 
generally failed by relying too heavily on command and control 
i nstr ume nts, and not heavily e nough on dece ntralized economic 
incentives. Kneese and S chultz (1 975) suggest a reason f or this 11over­
emphasis11 on command and control instrume nts- di scipline bias; most 
Congressme n are lawyers a nd their education, therefore , makes them 
familiar and comfortable with regulation by legal order. While 
education is likely to be a factor in the choice of reg ulatory 
instr ume nt, we may ask, if it were in the interest of legislator s to 
choose decentralized e conomic incentives would not they be come familiar 
and comfortable with them? 
The model provides another e xp lanation (beyond discipline bias) 
f or C ongressional preferences f or con:anand and contr ol over 
decentralized e conomic ince ntives in regulation. Whe n there is more 
conf lict and greater uncertainty, C ongressme n have greater concern wi th 
procedural safeguards. The very flexibility of e conomic ince ntives 
( the source of their strength to e conomi sts) is interpreted by the 
C ongressma n as uncontrolled uncertainty. A more favorable p olitical 
climate f or decentralized e conomic incentives is where there is little 
conflict and uncertainty. F or e xamp le , in e stablishi ng the CAB, where 
there was rela tively little conf lict a nd uncertainty, a decentralized 
instr ume nt, price setting , was in fact delegated to the agency. (But 
note tha t some of the uncertainty associated with price se tting was 
controlled by also delegating p ower to restrict ind ustry e ntry . )  
I n  the agency, perf ormance is evaluated not i n  terms of a globa l  
concep t of e conomic efficie ncy, but i n  terms of its ow n str ucture of 
12 
incentives. In order f or the agency to grow and pr osper it is 
imp or tant f or the agency to show some visib le sig ns of accomplishme nt 
toward its policy mandate and its specific goals as spe lled out in its 
sub stantive a uthority. 
To communicate with C ongress and to have its accomplishments 
be lieved, it is useful f or them to be concrete. To say "we improved 
the p ub lic health" is too vague without considerable evidence , 
especially of a quantita tive na ture . To say 11we banned dioxin" carries 
more weight as the achieveme nt is easily verifiable. Whe n there is 
greater conf lict a nd more uncertainty there is greater peril f or the 
agency and incidentally a greater need to justify its actions before 
C ongress. To maintain the support of its C ongressional sponsors, 
without whom the age ncy could not survive , the agency must report, very 
concretely, its achievements (because the sp onsor s are particularly 
se nsitive to criticisms that the agency is "doing nothing11). The 
agency ... s activities are de scribed in terms of its "planned program 
a chievements," or p .p . a  . ... s or ''beans.11 Beans have the advantage of 
being countable a nd verifiable. Banning dioxin is a bean. On the 
other hand, instituting an eff lue nt tax is less of a bean. 
Thus the agency will respond to the f orm of the regulatory 
i ntervention mandated by C ongress, and the envir onmental factors of 
conf lict and uncertainty by p ursuing only the most concrete and highly 
vi sible regulations. Such regulations have disadvantages, however, as 
they become targets f or C ongressional critics who represent interest 
groups hurt by the p lanned program accomplishme nts. The agency, 
realizing this vulnerability, has added ince ntive to make its 
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accomplishments defendable. Increasing the defendab il ity of the 
concrete, and visible , reg ulat ions in turn a dds t o  the already high 
fixed cost per regulation. The re sult is the 1000 page regulation, 
infrequent b ut well fort ified. And t o  just ify its large ( fixed) cost 
of promulgation, often large in scale. 
The strategy of a fe w .Qi&_ beans has led at t ime s t o  a se nse of 
fr ustration within the agency. Some regulatory attempt s be come t oo 
cumbersome t o  make it through the agency�for example, a fter 48 tries, 
the attempt to regulate asbestos was abandoned, hav ing never gone 
beyond EPA's Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances. It would have 
been a b ill ion dollar regulation. Other b ill ion dollar regulations 
such as on be nzene are remanded by the courts. And though a few b ig 
regulat ions surv ive , only a minute fraction of the problems are be ing 
addressed. 
A final characteristic of such regulatory pr oce ss follows from the 
reliance on conunand and control. Having chosen, partly in response t o  
congressional wishes, regulation by legal order,  the agency often finds 
it sel f  dictat ing specific technologic solutions. To survive court 
tests and polit ical pressures for de f e ndab ility this means that the 
agency must understand, or claim t o  understand, specific technological 
processes as well as the e xperts in the affected industry. Hav ing 
ma neuvered itself int o a position where it needs this type of spe cific 
infor mation, the agency p ut s  it sel f  at a particular disadvantage 
relative to the regulate d  firms, which specialize in this information 
in the course of their b usiness. 
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Within C ongress, perfor mance of an agency is often evaluate d  in 
terms of whether the agency has on balance benefited the constituencies 
of indiv idual congressmen. Whe n the a nswer is negat ive , the agency is 
l ikely to find out during oversight hearings, by hostile queries, by 
leg islat ive veto, or by reduced authorization or reduced b udget . 
In sum, then, conditions of h igh conflict of interest and great 
uncertainty will lead t o  a great deal of sub stantive discret ion and 
l ittle procedural discret ion for the administering agency. Under such 
condit ions, and with such a regulatory for m, relatively few regulations 
will be developed. And those regulat ions which are developed are 
l ikely to be quite compl icated and costly. Increased conflict and 
increased uncerta inty are, therefore, the ingre dients of regulat ory 
delay and inaction. 
C onditions of lower conflict of interest and less uncertainty, on 
the other hand, will lead to greater pr oce dural discretion over a 
smaller range of substantive choices. Under such condit ions, and with 
such a regulat ory form, regulat ory interve ntions will tend t o  be more 
flexible and less controversial from the standpoint of b oth C ongress 
and the agency. 
Illustrations 
It has been suggested elsewhere that environmental,  health and 
sa fety regulation entails a relatively greater degree of de cision 
mak ing uncertainty than doe s e conomic regulation (J oskow and Noll, 
1 978;  Mccubb ins 1982b ) .  F urther, McCubbins ( 1982a, 1982b) has argue d 
15 
that environmental, health and safety issues often present a relatively 
greater leve l of group conf lict than do e conomic regulatory issues.6 
If indeed there is more uncertainty and more conf lict in 
environmental, health and safety regulat ion than in e conomic 
regulation, then the model predicts a d ifference in the form of 
regulation, for these two areas . S pecifically, the model pred icts:  
( 1) A broader s co pe of s ubstantive (and d is cretionary) authority 
delegated to the Administrator under environmental, health and safety 
compared with economic reg ulation. 
(2) Along with the broader s co pe in s ubstantive author ity, a 
larger number of regulatory instruments ,  and a wider variety of them, 
delegated to the agency under environmental, health and safety 
regulation, compared with e conomic regulation. 
(3) More pro cedural requirements for decisionmak ing in 
env ironmental, health and safety regulation, compared with e conomic 
regulation. The model pred icts more public bearings and comment , more 
po ints of access to agency decisio nmak ing by o utside part ies ,  more 
access to j ud icial rev iew and more strenuous standards and burdens of 
evidence of env ironmental, health and safety regulation . We cons ider 
these compar isons in this section, for a few s pe cific illustrations. 
The � Substances Control Act 
The po licy mandate of Congress in legislating authority to EPA 
under the Toxic S ubstances Contro l Act (PL 94-46 9, Oct .  1976; 
referenced as TSCA) is des cribed, in quite noble language ,  in sect ion 
2(a )(2) of the act, 
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Adequate a uthority should e xist to reg ulate chemical 
substances and mixt ures which present an unreasonable r isk 
of inj ury to health or the env ironment.  
The s co pe of  regulatory a uthority granted EPA was broadly defined 
in sect ion 6(a) of the act, 
If the Admin istrator f inds that there is a reasonable 
basis to conclude that the manufact ure , pro cessing, 
d istr ibution in commerce ,  use ,  or d is posal of a chemical 
substance or mixt ure or that any combination of s uch 
a ct ivities,  presents ,  or will present an unreasonable r isk 
of inj ury to health or the environment , the Admin istrator 
sha ll by rule apply one or more of the following requirements 
to s uch substance or mixt ure to the e xtent necessary to 
protect adequately against s uch r isk us ing the least 
burdensome requirements .  
Broad regulatory d is cret ion was granted EPA under TSCA in three 
other sections as well: Sect ion 4 establishes and sets forth EPA's 
authority to require testing of new chemicals; Sect ion 5 establishes 
and sets forth EPA's a uthority to require prem.an ufacturing not ices for 
new chem icals; and Sect ion 7 sets forth the prov is ions and a uthority 
that EPA has to control imminent hazards . 
This broad delegation of regulatory a uthority was co upled with 
s imilarly broad d is cretion over the cho ice of reg ulatory instruments 
(as s uggested by the model of regulatory cho ice outlined earlier). The 
act mandates a wide set of regulatory me chan isms employable to carry 
through the po licy goals of the a ct .  A major s ubset of these 
instruments is defined in sect ion 6(a). EPA has been g iven the power 
to issue • • •
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Section 6(a) (emphasis o urs) 
(1) A requireme nt (A) prohibiting the manufacturing, 
processing ,  or d istributio n in commerce o f  such substance or 
mixture, or (B) l imiting the amo unt of such substance 
or mixture which may be manufac tured , processed, or d istr ibuted 
in commerce . 
(2) A requir em.e nt--CA) prohibiting the manufac ture, 
proce ssing or d istr ibution in commerce of such substance or 
mixture for (i) a particular use or (ii) a partic ular use in a 
co ncentratio n in e xcess o f  a level specified by the Adm inistrator 
in rule impo sing the requireme nt, or (B) limiting the amo unt 
o f  such substance or mixture wh ich may be manufactured, processed, 
or d istr ibuted in commerce for (i) a particular use or (ii) a 
par ticular use in a co ncentration in e xcess o f  a level spec ified 
by the Administrator in the rule impo sing the requireme nt. 
(3) A requireme nt tha t  such substance or mixture or any 
article co ntaining such substance or mixture be � � ru: 
accompanied J2.y � � adequate warnings and instructio ns with 
respect to its use , d istr ibutio n in commerce, or d ispo sal ,  or with 
respect to any combina tio n of such ac tiv ities. The form a nd content 
o f  such warnings and instructio ns shall be prescribed by the 
Administrator . 
(4) A requireme nt tha t  manufacturers and processors o f  such 
substance or mixture make ru: retain records o f  the processes 
used to manufacture or process such substance or mixture and 
monitor or conduct te sts which are reasonable and necessary to 
assure compliance with the requireme nts o f  any rule applicable 
under this subsection. 
(5) A requireme nt proh ibiting or o therwise regulating ,ggy 
manner or method o f  co nnnercial use o f  such substance or mixture . 
---(6 )(A) A requireme nt prohibiting or o therwise regulating 
any manner or method o f  d ispo sal of such substance or mixture, or o f  
any article containing such substance o r  mixture, by its manufacturer 
or proce ssor or by any o ther perso n  who uses, or d isposes o f, (B) may 
no t require any person to take any actio n  which would be in violation 
of any law or requireme nt o f, or in e ffect for ,  a State or pol itical 
subd iv ision, and shal l require each person subject to it to no tify 
each S tate and pol itical subd iv isio n  in which a required d ispo sal may 
occur of such d ispo sal . 
(7) A requireme nt d irecting manufacturers or proce ssors o f  such 
a substance or mixture (A) to give no tice o f  such unreaso nable 
risk o f  injury to d istributors in commerce o f  such substance or 
mixture and, to the e xte nt reasonably ascertainable, to o ther persons 
in po ssessio n o f  such substance or mixture or e xpo sed to such 
substance or mixture , (B) to give public notice o f  such r isk o f  
injury, and (C) to replace Q!.. repurchase such substance or mixture 
as elected by the perso n  to which the requireme nt is d irected . 
As suggested by th is e xcerpt from subsec tio n 6(a ) ,  Congress was 
very generous with regard to the regulatory instrume nts EPA co uld 
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employ to impleme nt policie s  under TSCA . EPA can impleme nt regulations 
pertaining to the production ac tiv ities (manufacture, proce ssing and 
d istr ibution) 'o f chemical manufacturers through command and co ntrol 
mechanisms (prohibitions a nd l imitatio ns) , as spec ified in subsec tio ns 
6(a ) {l ) ,  6(a) (2) , 6 (a) (5) , and 6 {a ) {6 ) . Congress also clearly mandated 
informatio nal mechanisms for the regulation o f  o ther activities as 
detailed in subsec tio ns 6(a)(3) and 6(a ) (7 )  (war nings and instr uctions 
and public notice) . 
This generosity with regard to regulatory instruments was an 
attempt by Congress to require EPA to take substantial action o n  to xic 
hazards. It was felt that by spec ifically mandating such a broad range 
o f  instrume nts EPA could approach a wide range o f  pro blems using 
methods which.would not o nly lead to swift resolutio n but would al so 
pass te sts o f  validity in court. In any case the pattern o f  
instrume nts spec ified fits precisely with the predic tio ns o f  the model . 
Along with the se varied mechanisms, e xte nsive procedural and due 
process requirements were detailed (in sections 4 ,  5 ,  6 ,  9 ,  1 9 ,  20 and 
21) for the exerc ise o f  the broad regulatory authority granted EPA 
under the act. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 9 of the statute , tho ugh defining 
who has what r ights before EPA, are primarily concerned with defining 
EPA regulatory decisio nm.aking procedures. F ig ure 2 details the leng thy 
procedures specified in the act tha t  EPA is required to follow for the 
promulgation o f  a regulatio n under sectio ns 4,  5 or 6 .  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
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Under the regulatory procedure defined in sec tions 4, 5 ,  and 6 ,  a 
manufac turer must submit no tice of intent to manufacture a new chemical 
substance 90 days prior to manufac ture; upo n such notice , and within 
the time frame specified in the act, EPA can take o ne of four courses 
of actio n: take not ac tio n (the usual decisio n) ; o btain a court order 
to require more testing pursuant to a test rule developed in sec tion 4 
(no tice that the procedures necessary to develop a test rule, o utlined 
in parts 4 and 5 of Figure 2, are e xtensive in their own right); 
Propose a regulatio n for the chemical which, if challenged, is subject 
to a court review necessitating the fulfillme nt of the numerous due 
process requireme nts of section 6 (part 6 figure l); or finally, if the 
chemical presents an immine nt risk of serious and widespread injury, 
EPA can o btain a court order to seize the chemical and the n  begin its 
rule-making activity. 
This lengthy procedure, outlined i n  Figure 2, guarantees tha t  all 
intere sted parties will have numerous points of access and influe nce in 
EPA decisionmaking under TSCA. Such access points are boxed in Figure 
2.  However, few rules have bee n  written, less tha n  a dozen actions 
have been completed under the rule making procedures specified in the 
act. The vast majority of the 70,000 chemicals in commerce have no t 
been affec ted by TSCA. 
EPA , under Sectio n 4, must promulgate test rules for tho se 
chemicals which it requires to be tested . Such tests are used to 
generate informatio n about the health and e nvironmental effects of the 
new chemical. Each test rule is in itself voluminous and require s  many 
months, even years, to develop. In the case of chlorome thane the cost 
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of pro mulgating the test rule (about $300,000) was several times more 
than the cost of the tests to be required . So far o nly a small 
fraction of the 70,000 chemical s  in commerce have been tested and o nly 
a few te st rules have bee n  written i n  TSCA's six year e xistence . 
Almo st all decisions by EPA under TSCA are subject to hearings a nd 
court appeals. F ur ther access is provided by sections 20 and 21 which 
e nfranchise all citizens, through the use of citizen pe titions or civil 
suits, to require e nforcement of TSCA by EPA (or reversal of ac tio n) .  
Sec tio n 1 9  f urther specifies that all actions by EPA under TSCA are 
subject to j udicial review in a federal district court. Though it is 
quite possible that all actions taken by EPA under !SCA would be 
subject to court review witho ut section 1 9  it is noteworthy here tha t  
Congress specifically e nfranchised a l l  interest parties (no t j ust those 
adversely affected by a ruling) to have a right of bringing a court 
review. F ur ther, unlike many o ther regulatory acts, court review of 
EPA deci sionmaking is po ssi ble at many j unctures �a final ruling 
is made . 
EPA is further required to coordinate closely its ac tivities with 
o ther federal health and safety programs. As each of the se programs 
has its own legislative manda te, decisionmaking structure, 
congressio nal oversight committees a nd clie ntele groups, each 
interac tion required of EPA magnifies the decisionmaking procedures a nd 
the number of intere sted parties involved in any rule making under 
TSCA . 
In subsectio n 4(e) EPA is required to develop a priority list of 
chemicals for the promulga tio n of test rules under sec tion 4. However, 
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the membership of the committee to develop this list is not EPA's sole 
domain; only one member of the eight member committee is appointed by 
EPA. 
Together the procedural specifications, due process guarantees, 
and inter-agency cooperation provisions serve to extend the decision­
making process in the Office of Toxic Substances and to enlarge the set 
of interest groups enfranchised to have a voice in agency decision­
making. This ultimately inhibits EPA from exercising the broad 
regulatory authority granted under TSCA. 
EPA was granted broad substantive discretionary authority to 
promulgate regulations controlling toxic chemicals in TSCA. This 
substantive authority was defined, largely in section 6 ,  through a 
broad range of regulatory instruments. This wide ranging substantive 
authority nicely fits the model and supports the argument advanced 
herein. The complex and labyrinthine regulatory procedures defined in 
the act similarly support the propositions and generalizations of the 
model. The performance of toxics regulation, then, is not a result of 
ill-designed legislation nor of sinister legislators nor of interest 
groups pursuing their own self-interests in smoke-filled backrooms, but 
can be seen as a natural consequence of the political process and of 
the uncertainties and controversies surrounding environmental, health 
and safety regulatory issues. 
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The Federal Food, Drug � Cosmetic Act 
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), as amended, 
provides the Food and Drug Administration and the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare with broad discretionary authority over the 
regulation of foods, food additives, pesticide residues, drugs, 
devices, animal drugs and cosmetics. This broad substantive authority 
conforms to the predictions derived in the model. The authority of the 
FDA, beyond its authority to prohibit the adulteration and misbranding 
of foods, drugs and cosmetics is outlined in Table 1 .  
Table 1 Here 
As Table l indicates, FDA can establish standards of quality and 
fill of container for food products, and can establish regulations 
limiting the quantity of poisonous or deleterious substances in food. 
Thus the FDA can establish 11filth levels" for hot dogs, "rodent 
excrement levels11 for flour, and 11mercury levels11 for swordfish. FDA 
can similarly regulate the levels of pesticides in raw agricultural 
commodities, and the quantity of food additives, such as cyclamates, in 
foods. 
New drugs must be certified as safe and efficacious for use prior 
to manufacture, as must new animal drugs. FDA further has the mandated 
authority to regulate color additives, such as red dye number 2. 
With the exception of section 407 , the authority of the FDA over 
foods, drugs and cosmetics is limited to the regulation of the 
production activities of firms producing such commodities, having had 
its authority over marketing transferred to the FTC prior to the 1938 
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act. The broad discretio nary authority the FDA has under the statute 
to regulate the production of foods, drugs, a nd cosmetics is also 
o ut lined in Table 1 .
However, this broad discretio nary authority over the prod uction of 
foods, drugs a nd cosmetics, as in the case of the Toxic S ubstances 
Control Act, is coupled with a great amo unt of procedural and d ue 
process s pecificity. The comple x and convo luted procedures s pecified 
for the regulation of pesticide residues,  food additives, and new drugs 
are readily evident in figures 3, 4 and 5,  a nd need little elaboration. 
That the FDA is indeed encumbered by these regulatory procedures a nd 
d ue process requireme nts should, by now, come as no s urprise. 
Figures 3 ,  4 and 5 Here 
However, the reluctance to regulate in the case of the Federal 
Food, Dr ug and Cosmetic Act has had different co nseque nces than similar 
diffic ulties under the Toxic Substances Control Act. In the case of 
TSCA the labyrinthine regulatory procedures serve to restrict EPA;s 
regulatory activities; as a result few chemicals of the hundreds of 
thousands developed each year are s ubject to regulatio n. On the other 
hand ,  a similar set of regulatory inst rume nts a nd procedures for the 
regulatio n of new drugs under the FFDCA, though similarly restricting 
the FDA;s regulatory activities, have a much different market o utcome. 
Without the test r ule requireme nts and e xplicit t ;me limits for actio n 
as s pecified for EPA decisionmaking in TSCA, the FDA can 11sit o n11 new 
drug applications indefinitely without taking action, and thus few new 
drugs are certified for production and use. 
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Society thus foregoes the potential benefits associated with many 
of these new drugs because they cannot f ind their way o ut of the 
legislated FDA procedural maze. Similarly, the catacombs of EPA;s 
legislated regulatory procedures ensure that few of the potentially 
dangerous chemicals developed each year are s ubject to EPA regulatio n. 
Neither situation is an opt imum as each presents an e xtreme "so lution11 
to the introduction of new prod ucts. 
The similarities in scope, form, and s ubsta nce of health and 
safety acts s uch as TSCA and the FFDCA, passed nearly 40 years apart, 
of fer compelling evidence for the model a nd pro positions develo ped 
earlier. The broad s ubstantive and narrow procedural authority granted 
in the FFDCA implies that the impleme ntation of the food and drug act 
will s uffer from maladies similar to those evidenced for EPA i n  TSCA. 
The form of the regulatory interve ntion chosen by Congress, as a res ult 
of the institutional structure of legislative decisio nmaking and 
e nviro nme ntal influe nces ( uncertainty a nd conf lict of interest), 
prevents the FDA from swift ly promulgating significant regulations. 
!..hg_ Federal Aviaton Act 
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the Federal Aviation Act of 
1958 estab lished a n  eco nomic reg ulatory agency, the Civil Aero na utics 
Board (origina lly the Civil Aeronautics Authority). The form of the 
regulatory interve ntion established is much different than those 
witnessed for the health and safety acts e xamined. 
The Federal Aviation Act (PL 8 5-726 ,  August 195 8) conti nued the 
e xistence and the economic regulatory f unctions of the Civil 
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Aeronautics Board. In the act the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was 
granted a uthor ity to iss ue cer tificates o f  pub lic conve nience and 
necess ity (i.e. to restrict e ntry), to iss ue permits to foreig n  a ir 
carr iers , to approve tariffs (i.e. to set pr ices) , to fix minimum mail 
loads, to es tab lish rates of return for the tra nsportaton o f  mail, and 
to approve a irline mergers .  
Thus , unlike the a uthor ity granted the health and safety agenc ies ,  
wherein each agency has broad reg ulatory a uthor ity over a wide range o f  
activ ities for a great many ind ustries and segments o f  socie ty, the CAB 
was gra nted a fa irly narrow authority to regulate the economic 
activ ities o f  a s pec ific ind ustry�the a irlines . The a uthor ity o f  the 
CAB to carry out its functions is granted largely in T itle IV through a 
variety o f  command and co ntrol mechanisms . Sectio n 401 specifies the 
CAB's a uthor ity over e ntry, 
Section 401 .  (a ) No air carrier shall e ngage in a ny a ir 
transporta tio n unless there is in force a cer tificate iss ued by 
the Board a uthorizing s uch a ir carrier to e ngage in s uch 
transporta tion. 
Section 403 de fines the CAB's pr ice-se tting powers (emphasis o urs), 
Sectio n 403. (a) Every a ir carrier a nd every foreig n  a ir 
carrier shall file with the Board • • •  tar iffs showing all rates, 
fares, a nd charges for air transportatio n between points served 
by it, • • •  and showing to the e xtent re quired 'J?.y regulations Qi. the 
Board, all classificatio ns ,  r ules , regulatio ns, prac tices, and 
services in co nnectio n  with s uch a ir tra nsportatio n. Tariffs sha ll 
be filed, posted, and pub lished in such form and manner, and shall 
contain s uch informatio n, �the Board shall .!?.:i regulatio n 
prescribe • • •
And, Sectio n  406 describes the CAB's power to set pr ices for the 
transportation o f  mail, 
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Sectio n 406 . (a ) The Board is empowered and d irected, upo n 
its own initia tive or upo n petition o f  the Postmaster General or 
an a ir carrier, (1) to fix and determine from time to time, a fter 
no tice and hearing, the fair and reaso nable rates o f  compensatio n  
for the transportatio n o f  mail by a ircraft, • • •
The authority granted to CAB is very s imilar in scope and in 
language to the a uthor ity granted the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
the Transportation Act o f  1920 and the Mo tor Carriers Act o f  1935. 
Such economic regulatory acts, born in s imilar interest group 
environme nts , share a s imilar ity of purpose a nd s tatue . The s pec ific 
a uthor ity vested in s uch acts e nables Congress, to deliver 
particularized benefits to s pec ific industries.  
Unlike TSCA or the FFDCA, however, the Federal Av iatio n Act and 
the Civ il Aeronautics Act s pec ified few procedural guidelines for the 
e xerc ise o f  the CAB's r ule mak ing a uthority. This flexib ility o f  
procedure e nabled the CAB to respo nd quickly and eas ily to a pplica tions 
filed by a ir carriers and to approve tho usands o f  s uch a pplications 
each year. The s tr iking d ifference in the leve l o f  procedural 
d iscretion granted the CAB under the act, in relation to the health a nd 
safe ty acts as outlined in figures 2 thro ugh 5 ,  is evidenced in the 
fo llowing s ubsec tio ns and in figure 6 ;  for the a pplica tio n for a 
cer tificate o f  pub lic convenience, 
Sectio n 401 . (b) Application for a certificate shall be 
made in wr1t1ng to the Board and shall be so verified, shall be 
in s uch form and co nta in s uch informa tio n, and shall be accompanied 
by such proof o f  serv ice upo n s uch interes ted person, � the 
�sha ll Ju:. re gula tio n re quire, (emphasis ours) 
and for an applica tio n for a perm it, 
27 
Sectio n  402. (c) Applicatio n for a permit shall be made in 
writing to the Bo ard ,  shall be so verified, shall be in such form 
and co ntain s uch informatio n, and shall be accompanied by s uch 
proof of service upo n such interes ted perso ns, £!§.. lli Bo ard 
ill!l �regulation require , (emphas is o urs) .  
The simplicity of the regulatory pro cedures s pe cified in the act 
for the estab lishment of airline tar iffs is quite appare nt in the above 
passage and in f ig ure 6 .  The pro cedural requirements of the act 
largely s pe cify th at the application mus t be f iled 30 days pr ior to 
e nforceme nt and that the docume nt must meet the technical requirements 
as determined by the Bo ard . 
F igure 6 Here 
The C ivil Aeronautics Act and the Federal Aviatio n Act present 
e xamples of regulatory leg is latio n which do !!:.Q.!;. mandate r igid and 
extens ive regulatory pro cedures for r ule mak ing. The history and form 
of these e co nomic regulatory acts, though vas tly d ifferent from the two 
e nviro nme ntal, health and s afety acts e xamined previo usly, are quite 
co nsistent with the model and pro pos itions outlined e arlier. In 
circums tances where the effects of regulation are know n and where the 
regulation is no t co ntroversial the leg is lature can prescribe a form of 
regulatory interve ntio n co nd ucive to the swift resolutio n  .of regulatory 
matters and the promulg atio n of s ignificant regulatio ns . Thus , due to 
the inf luence of e nvironme ntal factors (i.e. uncertainty and little 
co nf lict of interest) e co nom ic regulation, unlike e nv ironme ntal, health 
and safety regulation, is implementable in an Amer ican demo cr acy. 
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Discussio n  
We have s ugges ted that increased co nflict and uncertainty are 
prime ingredie nts of regulatory inaction. Moreover, the way in which 
these two factors affect the form of regulation. It h as also been 
sugges ted that to some e xtent the d iff iculties of is rooted in the 
American Constitutio nal system itself. The electoral and leg is lative 
ins titutions es tablished by the Constitution provide the motiv atio n for 
the cho ice of regulatory form. 
However, we are not s ugges ting that e nvironme ntal, health and 
safety regulation has failed altogether or that its limitatio ns are 
completely d ue to o ur particular system of demo cr acy. A very large 
f actor is the large amo unt of uncer tainty associated with po tential 
e nviro nme ntal r isks . This uncertainty ar ises from o ur limited 
understand ing of cancer mechanisms , o zo ne deple tio n and the o ther 
e nvironmental prob lems . The uncertainty is part of the nature of the 
problem. It is augmented in many cases by lo ng latency periods (twenty 
to forty years for carcinoge ns) .  
Nor are we s uggesting th at attempts to improve regulatory 
performance depe nd upo n chang ing the b as ic fe atures of American 
democr acy. It appears that there are possible, less fundame ntal, 
changes which might improve the pros pe cts of e nvironme ntal regulation. 
First, decentr alized instruments are not going to increase in usage 
merely be cause of e co nomis ts' e xhortatio ns. Whe n it becomes in the 
interest of legis lators and regulators to use them the ir usage will 
incre ase .  To promote their use, they need to be desig ned to decrease 
group co nf lict and uncertainty. For e xample, marketable quo tas 
decrease uncertainty as to the res ulting levels of air or water 
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quality. Sharing quota revenues with in the polluting industry may 
reduce group confl ict . Other compensation systems may be t ied t o  
decentralized instruments pr omoting e fficiency. Liability r ules may be 
t ied t o  cond itions of behavior wh ich limit liab ility. In many ways 
both uncert ainty and group conflict can be diminished within the design 
of decentral ized instruments. 
Second, uncert ainty can be reduced d irectly by research on 
environmental and health effe cts . Third, legislative and b ureaucratic 
polit ics change with changed percept ions of hazards,  as in the case of 
thalidomide, PBB's , or Three Mile Island. F ourth, the interaction 
between legis lat ors,  age ncy and interest groups changes with changes in 
campaign financing . 
C onclusion 
We have constructed a model in which the for m of the regulatory 
intervention is dete rmined by uncertainty and gr oup conflict of 
interest. Envir onmental, he alth and safety regulation.present iss ues 
which involve a great degree of uncertainty and involve a large amount 
of conflict of interest. As a res ult legis lat ors choose t o  delegate 
broad s ubst antive d is cretion and narrow procedural d is cretion t o  the 
administer ing agency which limits the age ncy's ab ility t o  p urs ue its 
legislative miss ion. 
The analys is in the foregoing p ages demonstrated that a relatively 
simple model of reg ulat ory choice can provide relat ively general 
st atements ab out various p uzzles, patterns and regularities in the 
politics of regulation. Extens ions t o  the model t o  include other 
influences, such as the str ucture of the regulated ind ustry (Mccubb ins , 
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1 982a), and other inst it ut ional actors,  s uch as the Pres ident and the 
courts, might fr uitfully extend the analysis presented here. 
TABLE l 
Summary of the 
Regulatory Mandate of the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(52-Stat. 1040) 
1. (Sec. 401) Establish common name for food products. 
2. (Sec. 401) Establish a standard of identity for food prqducts. 
3. (Sec. 401) Establish standards of quality for foods. 
4. (Sec. 401) Establish standards of fill of container. 
5. (Sec. 406) Establish regulations limiting the quantity of poisonous 
or deleterious substances in food. 
6. (Sec. 408) Establish tolerance levels for pesticides in or on raw
agricultural commodities. 
7. (Sec. 409) Establish regulations limiting the quantity of food 
additives in foods. 
8. (Sec. 409) Establish regulations limiting the varities of foods in 
which a food additive may be used. 
9. (Sec. 409) Set the manner in which a food additive may be added to 
or used in or on foods. 
10. (Sec. 409) Establish directions or other labeling or packaging 
requirements for food additives. 
11. (Sec. 505) Certify new drugs as safe for use. 
12. (Sec. 506) Certify batches of drugs containing insulin as safe for 
use. 
13. (Sec. 507) Certify batches of drugs containing antibiotics as safe 
for use. 
14. (Sec. 508) Designate an official name for any drug. 
15. (Sec. 512) Certify new animal drugs as safe for use. 
16. (Sec. 706) Establish tolerance limitations for color additives in 
foods, drugs or cosmetics. 
17. (Sec. 706) Establish specifications as to the manner in which a 
color additive may be added. 
18. (Sec. 706) Establish directions or other labeling or packaging 
requirements for a color additive. 
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Procedures for the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(90 Stat 2005) 
PREMANUFA.CIURING NOTIYICAIION 
Manuf.o.cturer decides to 111.:mufacturt.• a "n .. -w 
chem1c�i.l subsc.:mce" or an existing chemic�l 
substance for a "signific.:mt new use". 
l
R.o.s the �ministrator issued .o. rule urulcr 
Section 4 requiring testing of the 
substance? 
y« Mlinufacturcr performs the 
-----'---.;;> testing required by the rule-
NOl 
Is the subst.:ancc on the SuspN:t ChemlC"al 
Subsc::inccs List ..:ompllcJ under Sl.'Ction S(b}? 
YESl 
H.:i� m1.muf.:ictucrc pcr{ormNI tcstinr. pnr:;uant 
to a rule under Section 4? 
mi 
If no test rule:- has been -issued, m.inuf;icturcr 
develops own test d:it.:i 1.1h.lch he bcl iev..-s· ·i;Mws 
th.:at the substance vill not present ;m 
unreason.able risk to hc,"1.lth or the e1wironmcnt. 
J
t�nufacturer submits notice of intent to 
manufacture and relevant test d.i.t.:i to the 
administrator 90 days prior to manufacture. 
t
Administrator may extend 90 day notific.:icion 
period for .'.ln additional 90 d'1yS for good 
cau5e sho1ro. 
t 
-c;:--- Section 5 
Activities 
Docs the administrator propose a rule or NO Manufacturin& may proceed 
order prohibiting or limitin& the mnnufacturc after expiration of the 
o! the substance on the b.:lsis of insufficiency notificacion period. 
of information or a finding of an unreasonable 
risk 
YESl 
Section 5 Activities 
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Figure 2 Part 2 
Section 5 
ACTmTIES 
M.lnuf.:icturcr subniits notice of intent 
co ru.inufacturc 
l s ""' 




EPA publishes reasons If Administrator finds Section S(f) If Section 7 If chemical 
for nor rcqutrinit thE'tC may bc an Administrate>?' finds or 111ixcurc presents 
addit ional testins of unreason.ibl c  risk from there is a reasonable an imminent and 
sclcct�d produces. or use rcquir�s benefits basis co conclude that unre�sonablc ri�k o f  
does nothing o ri  those test l manufacturt', processing serious and 
nor rcquirtns notice. or distribution of vides.pread injury 
(Section S(g)) chemical or mixture 
i
presents or will 
Section S(c) EPA issues present an unte3son.able r;c:-7:-.,,�'=c-.-��-, 
proposed rule, 45 d;•ys rir.'k l Co to Federal 
M.lrk<:t product or u11-<' prior to c:xplr:n.ion·()r District court. C;:in 
pre:narket notific.:r.tion sei::e, require 
- per iod, r<"i..u1.1tin,11; th" repurchase, 
substance pcndin,11; 
dcvt:"lopment of 
additional d.1t.l pun:uant 
to a section 4 test rule 
1
If necessary gee 




Issue proposed rule 
,....limitinf:. chemical 
before end of 
notif ication period 
� 
If rule prohibits 
manufactut'c or use get 
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Expt.-dite :>.:. specified 
in Section 6(d) (2) (B) 
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Start section 6(a) 
rulemaking 
J
Section 6 Activities 
34 
Informa.t:ion from 
Not.ifi=tion process 55 
Figure 2 Part 3 
Section 4 
TESTING ACTIVITIES 
If adm:ln.istrator finds 
the chemical or misture 
(a) may present an Propose 
unreasontLble risk Rule 
Priority list §4e 
Out.side §4£ 
or 
(b) produced in 
significant 
,quantities 
and insufficient data 
Manufacturer or 
processor may file Final Rule 
for exempt.ion 4 (c) (2)---(may allow for 
if tests duplicative joint testing) -· I I .I I j I Judicilll .Rcviev I 
Administr.:u:or promulgates 
rules on fair and 
equitable reimbursement 















From Section 5 
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if "likely" to result in 
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If prohib i t  m:tnufacturc 
or use ne<.'<1 court ordc-r 
Figure 2 Part 4 
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no section 6 or 7 
rule applic11blc 
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Figure 3 
Procedures for Federal Food , Drug and Cosmetic Act 
for Establishing Tolerance Limits for P:!st.icides 
Tc.i;t..i; 
I
(Section 408 (d)) 
Application filed under ------� 
nru 
I
(Section i.oa (d)} 
File •pplic:.ition for 
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Test d.;i.t:.i and 
1nfori:iat1on filed 
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Rcque&t to refer 
petition to 
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no ' I 
Advi &ory committee Secretary c.i;tabliahes 
aa.kes recou:mend:.itions regulation 
I
Adversely affected 
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objectioM I 30 day.i; 
Copy of objection• 
aerve to pet.itiimer 












parties m.:ay !ile 
for Judicial Revie"' 
Secretary upon 
hi& OtJn initiative 
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Figure 4 
Procedures for :Federal Food , Drug .:ind Cosmetic Act, 
:Regula'tion of Food Additives 
· M.:lnufa.ct.urcr conducts 
test.s 
Sect.ion 409 (b) (1) 
Petition co Se<:reta.ry 
proposing che issUAnce _________ , Exemption 
of a regul.l cion prescribing 
the conditions under which 
a food additive may be st1fely 
used. · 1
Petitioner files relevant · 
informacion concerning additiv� 
as specified in Section 409 (b) (2) 
by RULE 
(Section 409 (i)) 
Secretary may propose 
a regulai::ion of a food 
additive on his own 
If requested manufaccuring data initiative 
must be sublilitted (Scccion 409 (b)(3)) (Section 409 (e)) 
and samples (Section 409. (b)(4)�. Jj30 days 30 dayo Notice pu�lished 190 days (90 doay extension) Secretnry sh.111 issue A RECUUTION < -·----
(Section 409 (c)) 
I 
Publish in FI:DERhl. REGISTER. 
30 d.1ys 
RULE with respect to objection 
ose adversely affected by 
regulation or rule may petition 






g g � =  u .• • e :!� , 
� 
� • 







F'FDCA Procedures for Regulation of ?1'e"' Drugs 
Mlln.ufacturer conducts 
tests 
(Section 505 (a}) 
Application for ne"' 
drug field 
Exeioption by rule 
(Section 505 (i))
(Section 505 (b)) 
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CAB Tariff Procedure 
AIRLINE DOCUMtN'l' HEtTS 
PROPOSES--TEalNICAl. REQUIREMENTS CAB 
NEW' J.S SPECIFIED IN --- WAIVER 1-. -REJECT 
TARIFF 14 CFR 221 ? no no 
yco 
NEW TARIFF WITllIN 
BOUNDS ESTABLISHED 
UNDER SECTION l002(d) (4) 
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ACT OF 1958 AND SPECIFIED 
UNDER 14 CFR 399 ? 
Ires 
ACCEPT TARIFF 
14 CFR 399 
EXEMPTION SPECIAL � REJECT 1:.: 
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1 .  This model is deve loped for m.ally in Mccubbins (1982a). On the 
model of legislative behavior �ee Mayhew (1974), Fenno (1973), 
Fiorina (1977),  S chwartz (1982), Shepsle a nd Weingast (1980) and 
Weingast (1978). A g ood s ource of refere nces for the literature on 
interest group behavior can be fond i n  Har mon (1978) and Or nstein 
and Elder (1978). In this paper the view of interest groups is 
similar t o  that developed by Stigler , 1971 . This version of 
admi nistrative age ncy behavior is discussed by J oskow (1974), 
Ferej ohn (1981) and McCubbi ns (1982a). 
2. Briefly, i nstrume nts in this framework may be categorized into four 
general categories for analysis : a) comma nd and control 
instruments - individualized instruments which regulate behavior 
through constraints on t.he choice sets of actors (for example;
price limits, route setting, quotas and e ffluent emission levels),
b )  infor mational instrume nts - instr ume nts which regulate behavior 
through a recharacterization of the good or service in transaction
(exa mp les are warning labels, for mula dis closures, advertising 
contr ols and ingredients dis closures), c) ince ntive-based
instruments - universal instruments which regulate behavior through 
an alteration of incentives for action (e xa mples are taxes , 
subsidies, marketable permits ,  marketable ration coupons), d )
pub lic provision - instruments which regulate behavior through 
competition from non-market provision of goods and/ or services (an 
42 
example is the regulation, through competition, of e le ctrical p ower 
pricing by the TVA). 
3 .  C ongress must prescribe e xp licit statutory limitati ons on 
admi nistrative discretion for the delegation of legislative 
authority t o  fit within the framework estab lished by the courts in 
Panama Refi ni ng Co. y. Ryan, 1935 (243 v . s .  388), !.-1.·A.· S chechter 
Pou ltry C orp. y. United States, 1935 (245 v . s .  495), and � ,y,. 
� £Q.tl £Q.. , 1936 (298 v . s ..  238). Broad delegations of
authority by the legislature must be a ccompanied with pr ocedural 
protections or an opp ortu nity for judicial review (see also � 
.Y..· � �' 1944 (321 v .s .. 414)).. However, there will still
be a great di fference between the pr ocedures pres cribed for various 
acts which fit within the framework of the delegation doctrine. 
4. According t o  Jacque ly n Warren, who worked for the Environme ntal
De fense Fund during the drafting of TSCA, much of the complexity of 
the a ct is due t o  the le ngthy legis lative struggle. 11There are 
layers of conditions which arose from the comp osition of the 
sub committee and its staff that day. Some of the legal
requirements are stronger or weaker depending on who was absent and 
who was tired day by day. Inconsiste ncies got in during the ebb 
and flow of the battle and not all of them were taken out .. " 
5 .  F or a discussion o f  definitions of regulatory performance see 
Cutler and J ohnson, 197 5 .  
43 
6 .  A notable di fference is that the Teamsters and the Airlines have 
opposed e conomic deregulation (price and entry); whereas the 
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